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INTRODUCTION 
Trademarks have been in use for thousands of years, for as long as 
people have used symbols to designate the ownership or origin of their 
goods.1  From ancient merchants marking their pottery, to ranchers 
branding their cattle, to medieval guild members displaying a common 
mark, the use of symbols to identify and distinguish oneself and one’s 
property is a practice that far outdates the laws created to regulate such 
symbols.2  The earliest legal recognition of trademarks did not come 
about until the late sixteenth century; in the United States, federal 
trademark laws were not passed until the late nineteenth century, 
despite their common use and long-recognized importance.3  Currently, 
federal trademark law is governed by the Lanham Act passed in 1946, 
which sets out the different types of trademarks recognized and 
protected by the federal government.4  While the number of trademark 
infringement suits has been steadily increasing over the years, one 
particular type of mark, the collective membership mark, has only 
recently come to the forefront of trademark law news because of a fierce 
legal battle between the federal government and a California motorcycle 
gang.5 
 
 1.  See ANNE GILSON LALONDE & JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.06 (2019) (stating 
that the use of marks dates back to more than 3500 years ago); see also  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:1 (5th ed. 2019) (explaining that symbols 
indicating ownership of articles and identification of the maker can be traced back 6,000 years). 
 2.  See BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN-SOURCE CASEBOOK 12 (2019) (describing the 
importance of marks to the operation of the guild system in medieval England); see also MCCARTHY, 
supra note 1, at § 5:2 (observing that the earliest example of trademark jurisprudence came about 
in Sandforth’s Case heard in 1584). 
 3.  See JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, HOPKINS ON TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: 
TRADE SECRETS, GOODWILL, ETC. §§ 5–6 (4th ed. 1924) (noting that the earliest example of trademark 
jurisprudence was the 1590 case of the English clothier who sought legal remedy for the ill use of 
his mark by another clothier); see also GILSON, supra note 1, at § 1.06 (observing that the first federal 
trademark laws did not come about until 1870 despite a long history of common law usage). 
 4.  See Lanham Act (Trademark Act of 1946) 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2006) (establishing 
a federal system of trademark laws); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017) (recounting 
the enactment of the Lanham Act and the fact that it is the foundation of current federal trademark 
law). 
 5.  See CompuMark Research Finds 80 Percent of C-Level Executives Agree Trademark 
Infringement is on the Rise, COMPUMARK (Mar. 27, 2017), 
https://www.compumark.com/newsroom/compumark-research-finds-80-percent-c-level-
executives-agree-trademark-infringement-rise/ (noting that of 440 C-level executives surveyed, 
eighty percent reported an increase in trademark infringement claims over the previous year); see 
also David Loy, Court Blocks Unconstitutional Government Seizure of Mongols Motorcycle Club 
Trademark, ACLU (Mar. 11, 2019 11:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/intellectual-
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In United States v. Mongol Nation, U.S. District Judge David O. Carter 
considered whether the U.S. government could seize the rights to the 
trademarks belonging to the Mongols Motorcycle Club (also known as 
the Mongol Nation), a California motorcycle club that had been found 
guilty of numerous offenses under the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (hereinafter “RICO”).6  Although trademarks 
have historically been considered commercial speech, the marks sought 
were collective membership marks, a type of trademark that is purely 
non-commercial.7  The members claimed a government seizure of their 
marks would violate several constitutional rights, chief among them 
their First Amendment freedom of speech and association rights.8  
Applying strict scrutiny, Judge Carter agreed and denied the forfeiture.9  
The government has since amended its request for the marks, 
continuing a ten-year quest that is indicative of a desire for a legal path 
to pursue this kind of forfeiture in the future.10 
If and when the Ninth Circuit hears the Nation case, it will be 
against the backdrop of two recent landmark Supreme Court decisions 
invalidating certain trademark bars as unconstitutionally infringing on 
 
property/court-blocks-unconstitutional-government-seizure-mongols (observing that the 
government has been attempting to acquire the Mongol Nation trademarks for ten years). 
 6.  See United States v. Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1095–97 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (explaining 
that the Mongol Nation Motorcycle Club was found guilty of RICO offenses and thus its marks were 
subject to forfeiture, pending Judge Carter’s decision on the matter); see also Loy, supra note 5 
(noting that the Mongol Nation Motorcycle Club had been found guilty of RICO violations but Judge 
Carter’s ruling denied criminal forfeiture of their marks). 
 7.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1096 (clarifying that Mongol Nation collective membership 
marks are solely to identify members of the club); see also Lisa P. Ramsey, Free Speech Challenges 
to Trademark Law After Matal v. Tam, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 401, 415 (2018) (discussing that trademarks 
are commercial speech that have an expressive component). 
 8.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1108 (describing the Mongol Nation arguments that 
forfeiture of their marks would constitute violations of their First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment 
rights); see also Joel Rubin, Jury Orders Mongols Motorcycle Club to Forfeit Logo Trademarks, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2019 5:10 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-mongols-trademark-
verdict-20190111-story.html (“[T]he jury’s decision should be set aside in light of the 1st 
Amendment issues.”). 
 9.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1114, 1130 (determining that the Mongol Nation’s use of 
noncommercial symbols constituted speech subject to First Amendment protections, and rejecting 
the government’s request to seize the marks); see also Loy, supra note 5 (explaining that the Mongol 
Nation ruling rebuked the government’s “affronts to the First Amendment”). 
 10.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1114 (stating that there were serious concerns about how 
the Government would use the rights associated with the marks in future cases); see also Serge F. 
Kovaleski, How to Crush an Outlaw Biker Club: Seize. . . Its Logo?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/mongols-motorcycle-club-government.html (citing 
prosecutor Thomas P. O’Brien as saying that the government was using the Mongol Nation case as 
a test case for a new way to have a “real impact . . . “). 
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the freedom of expression.11  Although these decisions demonstrate the 
Court’s shift towards an expansion of First Amendment protections with 
regards to trademarks, they address the issue of trademark registration, 
a decidedly different issue than the one in Nation (seizure of existing 
collective marks).12  A ruling for the government in Nation, with no clear 
treatment of the marks post-forfeiture, would further blur the line 
between commercial and free speech and embolden the government to 
pursue forfeiture of marks despite First Amendment concerns.13  
Although government seizure of property connected to criminal activity 
is a valid law enforcement objective, it must be balanced against 
constitutional rights to avoid government overreach.14  This could, in 
fact, be accomplished, even with collective marks.15 
Part I of this Comment discusses the origins of federal trademark 
law in the United States, and the basics on the life and death of collective 
marks.16  This section will also touch on criminal forfeiture of property, 
especially as it relates to a trademark, which is a form of intangible 
 
 11.  See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019) (finding that the “immoral or 
scandalous” bar under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) violates the First Amendment); see also Tam, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1751 (invalidating the disparagement clause under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) because it violates the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment). 
 12.  See Drew Jurgensen, When All You Have is a Hammer, Everything Looks Like a Nail In re 
Tam and the Federal Circuit’s Conflation of Federal Trademark Registration and the First 
Amendment, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 512, 515 (2016) (noting a growing trend in 
trademark jurisprudence to use First Amendment protections against government action such as 
registration); see also Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1095–97 (stating that the Government was 
requesting Mongol Nation collective membership marks already registered with the trademark 
office). 
 13.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1114 (stating that there were serious concerns about how 
the Government would use the rights associated with the marks in future cases); see also Rubin, 
supra note 8 (contending that barring Mongol Nation members from using their mark could 
potentially “cross[] constitutional lines set out by the 1st Amendment, which protects people’s 
rights to associate freely and express themselves”). 
 14.  See Igor V. Dubinsky, How Bad Boys Turn Good: The Role of Law in Transforming Criminal 
Organizations into Legitimate Entities by Making Rehabilitation an Economic Necessity, 5 DEPAUL 
BUS. & COMM. L.J. 379, 404–05 (2007) (reporting that the enactment of the RICO Act, containing the 
first criminal forfeiture statute in American history, led to the rapid diminishing of organized crime 
in the United States); see also Loy, supra note 5 (stating that the government’s attempt to seize the 
marks was overreaching and an abuse of power). 
 15.  See Government’s Second Amended Application for Preliminary Order of Forfeiture 
Against Defendant Mongol Nation (Collective Membership Marks Only) at 17, United States v. 
Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 2:13-cr-00106) [hereinafter Application] 
(contending that despite the Mongol Nation marks having an expressive component, they are still 
subject to criminal forfeiture). But see Larry Mantle, AirTalk: Will Stripping the Mongols Motorcycle 
Club Logo Violate First Amendment Rights? 89.3 KPCC at 9:15 (Jan. 15, 2019) 
https://www.scpr.org/programs/airtalk/2019/01/15/64081/will-stripping-the-mongols-
motorcycle-club-logo-vi/ (explaining that because trademark law confers negative rights on a 
mark, an attempt to restrain the Mongol Nation marks amounts to an unconstitutional restraint on 
freedom of speech). 
 16.  See infra Part I. 
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property.17  Part II is a brief overview of the Mongol Nation case and the 
principal arguments the court’s decision turned on, namely concerns 
over the treatment of the marks post-transfer, and violations of the 
members’ First Amendment freedom of speech and association rights.18 
Part III will analyze the expressive versus commercial components 
of collective marks to discern what type of scrutiny courts should apply 
in determining whether the marks are appropriate for forfeiture.19  
Finally, Parts IV and V will propose a novel solution that addresses the 
important policy issues and balances the objectives of the government 
and the Lanham Act.20 
I.     BACKGROUND 
A. History of trademarks and trademark law in the United States 
Trademark protection was the sole province of the states until the 
first federal statutory trademark law was passed in 1870.21  In 1879, 
however, the Supreme Court held that the federal trademark laws were 
drawing an unconstitutional power from the patents and copyright 
clause of the Constitution to regulate trademarks.22  In response, 
Congress, resting on its power under the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution, passed in 1905 a new federal trademark statute that 
expressly authorized the registration of trademarks for use in 
 
 17.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1107 (describing the process of criminal forfeiture of 
property, including intangible property, after conviction of a RICO offense); see also Tom Kulik, Why 
Criminal Forfeiture of the Mongols Nation’s Trademark is an Outlaw Idea, ABOVE THE LAW (Dec. 17, 
2018 5:48 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/12/why-criminal-forfeiture-of-the-mongols-
nations-trademark-is-an-outlaw-idea/ (describing how the government uses asset seizure to fight 
organized crime and how this applies to intellectual property). 
 18.  See infra Part II. 
 19.  See infra Part III. 
 20.  See infra Part IV–V; see also Tracy Reilly, Marks of Mayhem & Murder: When a Few Bad 
“Mongols” Spoil the Bunch, Should the Government Seize a Motorcycle Association’s Registered 
Trademark?, 7 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 60–61 (2009) (contending that trademark laws should be 
revamped to provide a more equitable solution considering the purposes of the Lanham Act and 
RICO, and the rights of trademark users). 
 21.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 5:2 (reporting that prior to the first federal trademark 
statute, all trademark law was state law); see also GILSON, supra note 1, at § 1.06 (relating that of 
sixty-two trademark cases heard by 1870, forty of them were heard in one state alone, and it was 
not until 1872 that the United States Supreme Court ruled on a trademark case). 
 22.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 5:3 (citing the Supreme Court’s rebuke of the 
government’s trademark regulation power in the Trademark Cases (Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 
(1879)), and noting that the federal government’s power to provide for trademark registration can 
arise only under its “Commerce Power”); see also BEEBE, supra note 2, at 21 (relating the Supreme 
Court’s holding that the trademark laws were improperly grounded on the patent and copyright 
clause of the Constitution). 
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commerce.23  It was followed by the Lanham Act in 1946, whose purpose 
is “to provide for the registration and protection of trademarks used in 
commerce.”24  The Act recognized that a right to a specific mark arises 
out of its use, not out of its registration.25 
B. Collective marks 
The most common type of trademark is used to identify and 
distinguish a person’s goods or services, such as a brand name or a 
logo.26  The Lanham Act additionally recognizes other types of marks 
such as the collective mark.27  There are two types of collective marks.28  
Collective trademarks and service marks indicate the commercial origin 
of goods or services as well as the membership of the goods or services 
provider in a certain group.29  An example of this type of mark would be 
the Florists’ Transworld Delivery mark (FTD), used by flower shops that 
belong to a specific flower delivery system.30 Collective membership 
 
 23.  See U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have the power . . . to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes . . .”); see also 
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 5:3 (detailing the enactment of 15 U.S.C. §§ 81 et seq., the Trademark 
Act of 1905). 
 24.  See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017) (citing the establishment of the Lanham 
Act in 1946 as the foundation for federal trademark laws); see also GILSON, supra note 1, at § 1.04 
(relating the purpose of the Lanham Act as set out in the preamble appearing before 15 U.S.C. § 
1051). 
 25.  See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 453 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“Federal law 
does not create trademarks.”); see also GILSON, supra note 1, at § 5:3 (“Trademark rights are created 
by use of a designation in the marketplace and are recognized by the common law.”). 
 26.  See John V. Tait, Trademark Regulations and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: Focusing on 
the Regulatory 
Objective to Classify Speech for First Amendment Analysis, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 897, 936 (1998) 
(observing that the most common usage of a trademark is to identify a product’s origin); see also 
Alexandra MacKay, Forfeiture and Collective Membership Marks, STITES & HARBISON PLLC (Mar. 20, 
2019) https://www.stites.com/resources/trademarkology/forfeiture-and-collective-
membership-marks (explaining that most marks are either trademarks or service marks). 
 27.  15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2006) (establishing the registrability of collective marks); see also 8 
TMEP § 1302.01 (8th ed. Oct. 2018) (explaining that the Lanham Act provides for registration of 
collective marks, even in the absence of an industrial or commercial establishment). 
 28.  See 8 TMEP § 1302.01 (8th ed. Oct. 2018) (stating there are two types of collective marks); 
see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
170, 173 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. May 25, 1976) (specifying the two basic types of collective 
marks). 
 29.  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (providing that collective trademarks and service marks indicate 
both membership in an association and a use of the mark in commerce); see also MCCARTHY, supra 
note 1, at § 19:98  (explaining that collective trademarks and service marks “are used by members 
of an organization to identify and distinguish their goods or services.”). 
 30.  See Collective Marks, JUSTIA (Nov. 27, 2019) https://www.justia.com/intellectual-
property/trademarks/categories-of-marks/collective-marks/ (offering FTD as an example of the 
collective mark used for commerce); see also Collective Mark: Everything You Need to Know, 
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marks, on the other hand, are not tied to a good or service; they are used 
to indicate membership in a collective group or organization, and there 
is no requirement that the mark be used for commercial purposes.31  
Examples of this type of mark include the National Rifle Association’s 
mark (NRA), and the American Automobile Association’s oval 
containing the letters AAA.32 The marks belonging to the Mongol Nation 
are collective membership marks, which members display once they 
have been vetted and approved by the group’s leaders.33 
i. Life and death of the collective mark 
To understand the controversy surrounding the government’s 
push to acquire the Mongol Nation marks, one must first understand 
both how marks are used during their lifetime, and what happens when 
they are  forcibly transferred to a new owner.34  A collective 
membership mark is owned by an organization, and registration of the 
mark allows the organization to protect it from unauthorized use by 
others.35  Although the mark owner exercises control over the mark’s 
 
UPCOUNSEL, (Nov. 27, 2019) https://www.upcounsel.com/collective-mark (describing the mark 
flower shops use to indicate they are part of a flower delivery system).  
 31.  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The term ‘collective mark’ means a trademark or service 
mark— (1) used by the members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group 
or organization, or (2) which such cooperative, association, or other collective group 
or organization has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on 
the principal register established by this chapter, and includes marks indicating membership in a 
union, an association, or other organization.”); see also 8 TMEP § 1304.01 (8th ed. Oct. 2018) 
(“Registration of these marks fills the need of collective organizations who do not use the symbols 
of their organizations on goods or services but who still wish to protect their marks from use by 
others.”). 
 32.  See Collective Marks, supra note 30 (offering AAA as an example of a collective 
membership mark); see also Rebecca A.E. Fewkes & Eric Ball, Trademarks: How (Not) to Strip the 
Leather Jacket Off the Biker’s Back, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Mar. 29, 2019) 
https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/trademarks-how-not-to-strip-the-leather-jacket-
off-the-bikers-back.aspx (explaining how the National Rifle Association of America has a collective 
mark to indicate membership in the organization). 
 33.  See United States v. Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1126–27 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (outlining the 
difference between “full-patch” members and prospects or probationary members); see also 
Application, supra note 15, at 3 (stipulating that the three Mongol Nation marks in question are 
collective membership marks awarded to “full-patch” as well as probationary members). 
 34.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1114 (stating that a forcible transfer of the trademarks and 
their associated legal rights presents an immediate harm to the Mongol Nation and its members); 
see also Reilly, supra note 20, at 56–57 (explaining that although in theory a trademark is freely 
transferable to the government in the same way real or tangible property is, unlike those kinds of 
property, a trademark is not easily separated from its prior ownership interests). 
 35.  See 8 TMEP § 1304.01 (8th ed. Oct. 2018) (explaining that registration of collective 
membership marks fills the need of collective organizations who wish to protect their marks from 
use by others); see also GILSON, supra note 1, at § 1.02(4) (describing the ownership, registration, 
and protection of collective marks). 
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use, the sole purpose of a membership mark is to indicate membership; 
thus, only members may use the mark.36 
All trademarks, including collective membership marks, require 
actual and continuous use in order for a business or organization to 
retain a protectible interest in its mark.37  However, certain actions can 
cause it to cease to be associated with the mark owner, which destroys 
the owner’s rights.38  A mark is deemed abandoned when its use is 
discontinued and there is no intent to resume said use, or when the 
owner’s conduct causes the mark to lose its significance.39  A period of 
non-use for three consecutive years can also result in the cancellation of 
a mark.40  Furthermore, a mark may be subject to cancellation if another 
party challenges its validity within the prescribed period, or if it has 
been improperly registered or assigned.41  This is where trademark 
goodwill comes into play.42  Marks represent a reputation for the nature 
and quality of the business, a concept referred to as the goodwill of the 
mark.43  This goodwill is inseparable from the business or 
 
 36.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 29, at § 19:101 (specifying that collective membership marks 
are used to indicate membership and not goods or services); see also 8 TMEP § 1304.01 (8th ed. 
Oct. 2018) (explaining that even though mark owners exercise control over the use of their 
collective membership marks, only members may use the marks). 
 37.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence 
of abandonment.”); see also Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1022–23 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (stating that trademarks require use in order for them to be enforceable against others). 
 38.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining mark abandonment as when use is discontinued 
with no intent to resume use, or when the owner’s conduct causes the mark to become the generic 
name for the goods or services associated with it); see also Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal 
Prod. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1059 (2d Cir. 1985) (listing the different ways a mark ceases to be 
enforceable). 
 39.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining mark abandonment as when use is discontinued 
with no intent to resume use, or when the owner’s conduct causes the mark to become the generic 
name for the goods or services associated with it); see also BEEBE, supra note 2, at 669-76 (listing a 
case, ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007), which exemplifies the abandonment 
of a mark by cessation of use). 
 40.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2019) (“Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence 
of abandonment.”); see also Cash Processing Servs. v. Ambient Entm’t, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 
(D. Nev. 2006) (explaining that after a three-year period of nonuse, the owner of a trademark must 
rebut the presumption of abandonment). 
 41.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)–(e) (2019) (listing the reasons for denial of registration of a 
trademark in the federal register); see also BEEBE, supra note 2, at 290 (discussing the process for a 
third party to petition to cancel an existing registered trademark). 
 42.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 29, at § 18:2 (discussing goodwill, and that separating a 
trademark from its goodwill invalidates both); see also Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History 
of The Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U.L. REV. 547, 548 (2006) (describing goodwill 
as something “like a spirit” that hovers over the mark, or an “aroma that springs from the conduct 
of the business . . .”). 
 43.  See Defiance, 759 F.2d at 1059 (“A trademark or trade name symbolizes the goodwill 
attaching to a business.”); see also LOVE, supra note 3, at § 96 (explaining that a trademark only 
exists because it is tied to a good or service, making trademark and the goodwill of a business 
inseparable). 
RENEGADE RIDERS AND THE MARKS THEY LOVE 5/29/2020  6:59 PM 
318 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.  Vol 19:3 
organization.44  Using the mark in connection with a different goodwill 
would create confusion, which is contrary to the Lanham Act’s purpose 
of preventing consumer confusion in the marketplace.45  Thus, when a 
mark is transferred, the assignee is expected to “step into the shoes” of 
the assignor, continuing the identity and meaning of the mark, and 
gaining whatever goodwill and rights the assignor had built up.46  This 
makes forcible seizure of trademarks distinctly different than forcible 
seizure of other types of intangible assets not tied to any goodwill, such 
as patents and domain names.47 
C. Civil and criminal forfeiture 
Federal law provides for forfeiture of property that constitutes, or 
is traceable to, certain unlawful activity.48  While tangible property is 
generally the type of property seized, the government acknowledges the 
value of certain kinds of intangible property and will seek to acquire it 
in a forfeiture action.49  Even though the activity leading to the seizure 
 
 44.  See United States v. Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (stating that the 
transfer of a mark without its associated goodwill is legally invalid); see also LOVE, supra note 3, at 
§ 96 (stating that a mark and its goodwill are inseparable). 
 45.  See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (stating that one purpose of the 
Lanham Act is to prevent consumers from being deceived); see also Michael Cavendish, Avoiding 
Illegal Trademark Transfers: Introducing the Assignment-in-Gross, FLA. BAR J. (Mar. 2000) 
(https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/avoiding-illegal-trademark-transfers-
introducing-the-assignment-in-gross/) (explaining that the purpose of the Lanham Act’s 
assignment-in-gross rule is to protect the public “from being misled or confused about the source 
and nature of the goods and services” associated with the mark). 
 46.  See Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 930 (2d Cir. 1984) (invalidating the sale of a singing 
group’s trademark because there was “neither continuity of management nor quality and style of 
music” in the new mark owner); see also Cavendish, supra note 45 (explaining the assignment-in-
gross doctrine, where a court will invalidate the transfer of a mark because the mark’s goodwill and 
other assets did not transfer with it to the assignee). 
 47.  See Amicus Curiae Brief of Seven Law Professors in Support of Neither Party at 6, United 
States v. Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 2:13-cr-00106) [hereinafter Professors] 
(emphasizing the difference between trademarks and other types of intellectual property is that a 
trademark cannot be a right in gross); see also Cavendish, supra note 45 (explaining that a 
trademark assignment that negates the trademark’s associated product or service is an 
assignment-in-gross and thus invalid). 
 48.  18 U.S.C. §§ 981–982 (2016) (establishing that any property constituting or deriving from 
activity traceable to violations of specified laws is subject to civil and criminal forfeiture to the 
United States). See also Kulik, supra note 18 (stating that criminal forfeiture is “an interesting tool” 
the prosecutor may use in the criminal prosecution of a defendant). 
 49.  See United States v. One-Sixth Share of James J. Bulger in All Present and Future Proceeds 
of Mass Millions Lottery Ticket No. M246233, 326 F.3d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 2003) (forfeiting on a one-
sixth share of future lottery payments owed to fugitive James “Whitey” Bulger); United States v. 
Approximately Two Thousand, Five Hundred Thirty-Eight Point Eighty-Five Shares (2,538.85) of 
Stock Certificates of Ponce Leones Baseball Club, Inc., 988 F.2d 1281, 1282 (1st Cir. 1993) (seeking 
forfeiture of 2,538.85 shares of stock of the Ponce Leones Baseball Club, Inc.); Cash Processing 
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is criminal in nature, a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite for civil 
forfeiture.50  Criminal forfeiture, on the other hand, does require a 
conviction because it is designed to punish criminal acts.51  The RICO 
Act, for example, provides for criminal forfeiture of any tangible or 
intangible property in connection with RICO violations, vesting in the 
government all right, title, and interest in seized property.52  Since the 
Mongol Nation was found guilty of committing RICO offenses and using 
their marks in the process, seeking their trademarks was within the 
government’s rights.53 
II.     THE MONGOL NATION CASE 
Founded in 1969 in Southern California, The Mongol Nation is one 
of the largest “outlaw” motorcycle gangs according to a 2015 FBI 
report.54  As they ride across different parts of the United States, 
members proudly wear their Mongol Nation patches and tattoos, a right 
that can only be earned after an intense vetting process that often entails 
criminal activity.55  After infiltrating the gang with undercover agents, in 
 
Servs. v. Ambient Entm’t, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Nev. 2006) (acquiring the trademark of the 
Mustang Ranch brothel). 
 50.  OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC. EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES, 362 (2013) 
(https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
ccips/legacy/2015/03/26/prosecuting_ip_crimes_manual_2013.pdf) (“Civil forfeiture 
proceedings are not part of a criminal case at all. The burden of proof is a preponderance of the 
evidence, and civil forfeiture proceedings can dispose of property even without a criminal 
conviction or the filing of any criminal charges.”); see also Chip Mellor, Civil Forfeiture Laws And The 
Continued Assault On Private Property, FORBES (June 8, 2011 5:30 PM) 
https://www.forbes.com/2011/06/08/property-civil-forfeiture.html#14d7ffca39fa (explaining 
that in civil forfeiture a crime need not have been committed for the government to seize property). 
 51.  See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998) (“The forfeiture serves no 
remedial purpose, is designed to punish the offender, and cannot be imposed upon innocent 
owners.”); see also Reilly, supra note 20, at 5 (explaining that punishment for engaging in illegal 
acts is the public policy aim behind the criminal forfeiture of property). 
 52.  18 U.S.C. § 1963 (a)–(c) (establishing criminal forfeiture of tangible and intangible 
property for RICO offenses); see also United States v. Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 
2019) (explaining that under RICO defendants convicted of racketeering face forfeiture of any 
assets connected to the activity). 
 53.  See Cash Processing Servs. v. Ambient Entm’t, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1229 (D. Nev. 2006) 
(relaying the government seizure of the Mustang Ranch assets, which included their trademark, 
after a conviction for racketeering); see also Mantle, supra note 15 at 4:52 (stating that the 
government has a right to seize any property, tangible or intangible, that was used to conduct 
racketeering activity). 
 54.  See Fewkes & Ball, supra note 32 (explaining that the Mongol Nation is known to the 
Department of Justice as an extremely violent and dangerous motorcycle gang); see also Kovaleski, 
supra note 10 (detailing the founding of the Mongol Nation in Los Angeles in 1969). 
 55.  See Application, supra note 15, at 19 (describing how members were rewarded for their 
criminal acts with Mongol Nation emblems that they would proudly display); see also Reilly, supra 
RENEGADE RIDERS AND THE MARKS THEY LOVE 5/29/2020  6:59 PM 
320 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.  Vol 19:3 
2008 the government began criminal proceedings against Mongol 
Nation members, eventually convicting seventy-seven members of 
numerous racketeering acts under RICO.56  The government moved for 
forfeiture of not just property bearing the Mongol Nation trademarks, 
but the marks themselves, setting off the decade-long back-and-forth 
that led to the district court ruling in February, 2019.57  The court 
rejected the government’s claim to the marks, finding that a forcible 
transfer would, in this particular case, violate fundamental concepts of 
trademark law, as well as the First and Eighth Amendments.58  While it 
is important that the court considered whether forfeiture would violate 
the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause prohibiting cruel and 
unusual punishment, it is the concept of trademark goodwill and the 
expressive nature of the collective mark that are dispositive in 
determining whether or not forfeiture is possible.59 
A. The goodwill of the Mongol Nation marks 
The district court properly observed that the marks of the Mongols 
are “inextricably intertwined with identification with and membership 
in the Mongol Nation motorcycle club.”60  As such, the marks must be 
assigned with their associated goodwill in order for the transfer to be 
legally valid.61  This makes a forcible seizure of the marks problematic, 
 
note 20, at 11 (explaining that bikers in outlaw motorcycle gangs proudly display their affiliation 
in an effort to publicly announce their sexual and criminal exploits).   
 56.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. at 1099 (outlining the criminal proceedings of seventy-nine 
Mongols that resulted in seventy-seven guilty pleas); see also Fewkes & Ball, supra note 32 
(describing Operation Black Rain where eight government agents infiltrated the Mongols, and 
which eventually led to the convictions for RICO offenses). 
 57.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1099, 1113 (detailing the government’s motions to take 
control of the mark as well as seize any property bearing it, and the fact these efforts have spanned 
a decade); see also MacKay, supra note 26 (stating that the government sought the property the jury 
had found was subject to criminal forfeiture). 
 58.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1125, 1130 (holding that the First and Eighth Amendments 
prohibit the government’s forfeiture of the Mongol Nation marks, and that their forced transfer 
would be invalidated anyway because they would be transferred in gross); see also MacKay, supra 
note 26 (providing an overview of the First and Eighth Amendment considerations in the Mongol 
Nation decision). 
 59.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”); see also Application, supra note 15, at 17 (stating that the court 
must determine whether the forfeiture constitutes “inappropriate prior restraint on expression 
protected by the First Amendment”). 
 60.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1125 (discussing the existence of an expressive component 
to the marks); see also Fewkes & Ball, supra note 32 (explaining that the associated goodwill in the 
Mongol marks is membership in an association dedicated to motorcycle riding).  
 61.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 29, at § 18:2 (“A sale of a trademark apart from its Goodwill is 
called an ‘Assignment in Gross’ and is invalid.”); see also Cavendish, supra note 45 (explaining that 
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as the government would need to act as a motorcycle club in order to 
step into the shoes of the original mark holder.62  Since the government 
is not likely to do this, the mark would be divorced from its goodwill, 
resulting in an assignment in gross, which renders the transfer legally 
invalid.63  Thus, ironically, under current trademark law, forfeiture to 
the government of the Mongol Nation marks would actually lead to them 
entering the public domain, thereafter free for anyone to use.64 
B. The First Amendment 
The court explained that because the Mongol Nation marks are 
used by members to identify themselves and express an affinity for 
motorcycle riding, they are associative in nature and thus constitute free 
speech which is protected by the First Amendment.65  Seizure of the 
marks by the government would have a chilling effect on this speech, 
and since the government indicated an intent to foreclose on members’ 
ability to display the marks because of what they stood for, the court 
also found the forfeiture to be viewpoint-discriminatory.66  As such, 
strict scrutiny applied, and under this analysis, the forfeiture 
constituted an improper prior restraint on First Amendment 
 
trademark assignments are declared illegal if they are transferred apart from their attached 
goodwill). 
 62.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1124 (explaining that when collective membership marks 
are transferred they are expected to continue representing membership in and association with 
the original organization); see also Kovaleski, supra note 10 (stating that the government would 
need to operate a motorcycle club in order to not run afoul of the goodwill requirement). 
 63.  See Burgess v. Gilman, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056 (D. Nev. 2007) (“[A] mark cannot be 
assigned for use by a business with fundamentally dissimilar goods and services.”); see also Mantle, 
supra note 15 at 3:00 (explaining that the government is not likely to run a motorcycle club called 
the Mongols and sue others who use the symbols). 
 64.  See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 147 (2d Cir. 2007) (asserting that once a mark 
is abandoned, it returns to the public domain and may be used by other actors in the marketplace); 
see also Professors, supra note 47 at 6 (explaining that the government would need to use the 
Mongol marks for the registered purpose, otherwise the marks would be deemed abandoned upon 
forfeiture). 
 65.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1112 (finding that since the Mongol marks are used to 
indicate membership and appreciation of motorcycle riding, their forfeiture to the government 
would violate the First Amendment); see also Rebecca A.E. Fewkes & Eric Ball, Biker TM Case Sets 
New Bar For First Amendment Protection, LAW360 (May 9, 2019) 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1158260/biker-tm-case-sets-new-bar-for-first-amendment-
protection (relating that the court held the marks were protected from forfeiture by the First and 
Eighth Amendments). 
 66.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1102-03 (finding that the government’s purpose for seizing 
the marks amounts to viewpoint discrimination as well as prior restraint); see also Reilly, supra 
note 20, at 36 (arguing that the right to express a viewpoint, however unpleasant, is grounded in 
the First Amendment). 
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expression.67  But should the courts always apply the highest scrutiny to 
collective membership marks?68  Just how much weight should 
expression be given in the analysis?69 
III.     DISCUSSION: NOT ALL COLLECTIVE MARKS 
ARE CREATED EQUAL 
A. Collective marks and commercial speech 
Despite the fact that commercial speech is thought to do “no more 
than propose a commercial transaction,” it nevertheless may enjoy 
certain protection under the First Amendment.70  However, for some 
collective marks, like the membership mark, the commercial and non-
commercial elements can be “inextricably intertwined.”71  While some 
courts will automatically employ a strict scrutiny review when this 
 
 67.  See Application, supra note 15, at 17 (stating that the court must determine whether the 
forfeiture constitutes “inappropriate prior restraint on expression protected by the First 
Amendment”); see also Brian L. Frye, Lisa Ramsey on Trademark Law & the First Amendment, IPSE 
DIXIT (July 1, 2019) at 20:20 https://shows.pippa.io/ipse-dixit/episodes/lisa-ramsey-on-
trademark-law-the-first-amendment (explaining that where the speech being regulated is non-
commercial or viewpoint discriminatory, strict scrutiny analysis is likely warranted). 
 68.  See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (establishing that strict scrutiny 
review is appropriate for government regulation of message or viewpoint); see also Alexandra 
Martinez, The Act of Registering a Trademark: Commercial Speech, Non-Commercial Speech, or a 
Combination of Both? 14 (2017) (unpublished comment) (on file with the University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law) 
(http://www.inta.org/Academics/Documents/2017/Martinez_%20Student%20Winner.pdf) 
(explaining that restraint on the content of expressive speech must survive strict scrutiny review 
by courts). 
 69.  See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338 (discussing how “marks often have an expressive aspect 
over and above their commercial-speech aspect.”); see also Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. 
Supp. 3d 439, 460–61 (E.D. Va. 2015) (discussing the purpose of the federal trademark program 
and the weight of the expressive element). 
 70.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) 
(establishing that commercial speech is not so removed from expression that it lacks protection); 
see also Frye, supra note 67 at 18:26 https://shows.pippa.io/ipse-dixit/episodes/lisa-ramsey-on-
trademark-law-the-first-amendment (discussing that under current law, if the speech is 
commercial speech, an intermediate level of scrutiny applies). 
 71.  See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1339 (explaining that when commercial and expressive speech 
are “inextricably intertwined” they are treated as expressive speech under the First Amendment 
when the expressive aspect is being regulated). But see Brief Of Amicus Curiae On Behalf of the Int’l 
Trademark Ass’n in Support of Respondent at 17-18, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (No. 15-1293) 
[hereinafter INTA] (contending that an expressive component in a trademark “does not change the 
mark’s commercial character and should not change the traditional level of scrutiny used for 
commercial speech.” INTA is a global association of over 31,000 trademark and intellectual 
property professionals dedicated to promoting consumer trust, economic growth, and innovation.). 
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occurs, the commercial essence of the mark demands instead a 
balancing test to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny.72 
To enjoy federal trademark protections, marks must be “used in 
commerce,” defined as use that affects interstate commerce, which is 
most often reached through the sale of a good or service.73  Although 
some collective marks are not tied to specific goods or services, there 
are several factors that underscore the commercial nature of 
trademarks, leading many to find that all trademarks constitute some 
level of commercial speech, even collective marks.74  The first 
consideration is the origins and purpose of the Lanham Act.75  The Act is 
premised in Congress’ Commerce powers, and the goal of trademark 
laws is the regulation of commerce to protect consumers and prevent 
damage to business’ goodwill due to the improper acts of others.76  
Congress’ authority to provide for registration and protection of marks 
is thus limited to marks used in commerce.77  Although this creates 
tension with the expressive aspect of collective marks, it should not by 
any means be disregarded.78 
 
 72.  See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1377–78 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Majority 
mistakenly chose to apply strict scrutiny to a mark that was both commercial and expressive); see 
also Martinez, supra note 68, at 2 (stating that there must be a determination whether a trademark 
is commercial or non-commercial speech, and what degree of First Amendment protection it should 
be given). 
 73.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The word ‘commerce’ means all commerce which may 
lawfully be regulated by Congress.”); see also BEEBE, supra note 2, at 246 (explaining that federal 
trademark law only regulates uses that fall within the Congress’s Commerce Clause power). 
 74.  See INTA, supra note 71, at 3 (stating that trademarks are inherently commercial in nature 
and thus should be treated as commercial speech); see also Ramsey, supra note 7, at 435 (explaining 
that the line between commercial and free speech is sometimes unclear). 
 75.  See Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 2015) (announcing that 
the first piece of their analysis must begin with a brief review of Lanham Act principles related to 
the cause of action); see also Kelly Knoll, Confusion Likely: Standing Requirements for Legal 
Representatives Under the Lanham Act, COLUMBIA L. REV. 983, 988 (2015) (recounting that the 
Lanham Act broke new ground by providing for detailed descriptions of categories of marks that 
could and could not be registered, as well as remedies for infringement and “false designation of 
origin”). 
 76.  See 8 TMEP Introduction (8th ed. Oct. 2018) (establishing that Congress’ authority to 
regulate trademarks stems from the Commerce Clause) ; see also INTA, supra note 71, at 14 
(explaining the primary justification for trademark laws is the regulation of commerce). 
 77.  See Brookfield Communs., Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1051 (9th Cir. 
1999) (discussing the strengthening of the “use in commerce” requirement in a 1988 amendment 
to the Lanham Act); see also BEEBE, supra note 2, at 246 (explaining that federal trademark law only 
regulates uses that fall within the Congress’s Commerce Clause power). 
 78.  See Fewkes & Ball, supra note 65 (expressing that trademark law is ill-equipped to handle 
individual expression because it is designed to protect commercial interests); see also Kulik, supra 
note 18 (describing the tension between free speech rights and the commercial rights of 
trademarks). 
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While the creation and use of a mark is expressive in nature, the 
registration of the mark is not; the purpose behind registering a 
trademark is to provide it federal protection against unauthorized use 
in commerce on a federal level.79  Trademarks, expressive or not, enjoy 
common law rights even when they are not registered, and owners can 
still use and protect their marks at the state level.80  Thus, seeking 
federal trademark protection, even for collective marks, is a wholly 
commercial decision.81  In addition, the motivations behind the use of a 
collective mark are often commercial in nature as well.82  A collective 
membership mark, for example, represents something that has value, be 
it membership in a church, union, or outlaw motorcycle gang.83  The 
visibility of the mark serves more than just to identify, it serves to grow 
the organization, which is important for its continuity as well as its 
economic and political strength.84  And the most common way to 
increase visibility is to display the mark on goods such as clothing and 
 
 79.  See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 460–61 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“[T]he 
purpose of [federal trademark registration] is not for the expression of private views or interests. 
Such expression would lay in the creation of the mark itself.”); see also Jurgensen, supra note 12, at 
514 (noting the commercial motivations behind registration of a mark). But see Jeffrey Lefstin, Does 
the First Amendment Bar Cancellation of Redskins?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 665, 698 (2000) (arguing for the 
significance of expression in trademarks because registration derives from an expressive choice of 
what message to convey and with which words or symbols). 
 80.  See Keebler Co v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372 (1st Cir. 1980) (explaining that 
the underlying right in a trademark arises from its use, which is essentially a common law right); 
see also Jurgensen, supra note 12, at 534 (stating that failing to register a trademark on the federal 
registry does not divest a mark of its common law protections). 
 81.  See Ex Parte Jerusalem, 109 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 248, 250 (Comm’r Pat. & Trademarks January 
1, 1956) (stating that it seems “obvious” the purpose of registering a mark is to prevent registration 
“of such names or insignia to others who might use them commercially . . .”); see also Fewkes & Ball, 
supra note 65 (explaining that trademark law is designed to protect commercial interests). 
 82.  See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The nature of trademarks seeking 
federal registration for use in interstate commerce, when considered as a whole, is indisputably 
commercial . . .”) ; see also Jurgensen, supra note 12, at 514 (noting the commercial motivations 
behind registration of a mark). 
 83.  See Fred Barbash & Meagan Flynn, The Feds Spent a Decade Trying to Seize the Mongol 
Club’s Notorious Patch. A Judge Ruled They Can’t Have It., THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2019 5:48 
AM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/01/feds-spent-decade-trying-seize-
mongol-nations-notorious-patch-judge-ruled-they-cant-have-it/ (describing the importance of the 
marks to the Mongol Nation); see also Jurgensen, supra note 12, at 524–25 (noting that all marks 
hold value for their owners). 
 84.  See Peter Finn, NRA Money Helped Reshape Gun Law, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2013) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nra-money-helped-reshape-gun-
law/2013/03/13/73d71e22-829a-11e2-b99e-6baf4ebe42df_story.html (discussing how the NRA 
funded the academic research that was used to change the legal interpretation of Second 
Amendment rights); Reilly, supra note 20, at 14 (detailing that the Mongol Nation was able to 
challenge the Hells Angels for territorial ownership after many years of rapid membership growth); 
Teamsters’ Largest GOTV Effort In History Helps Re-Elect Obama, TEAMSTERS (November 7, 2012) 
https://teamster.org/news/2013/08/teamsters-largest-gotv-effort-history-helps-re-elect-obama 
(stating that the Teamsters’ political effort aided the re-election of President Barack Obama). 
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housewares, promotional materials such as banners and pamphlets, and 
cyber resources such as websites and emails– all examples of the mark 
being used in commerce.85 
Further highlighting the commercial aspect of collective marks are 
the benefits afforded to members which are often commercial in 
nature.86  For example, members who belong to a labor union enjoy 
better economic opportunities because the unions are able to leverage 
their member numbers to negotiate favorable working conditions and 
other protections on their behalf.87  Additionally, some collective marks, 
such as the AAA or PGA (Professional Golfers’ Association) marks, have 
an impact on commerce in the form of benefits or discounts on goods 
and services; when a business or person displays the mark it is generally 
understood that they offer something of commercial value (i.e. a price 
discount, a guarantee of quality).88  Businesses and individuals alike use 
the marks as a marketing tool to boost sales, or as a factor in deciding 
on a purchase or hire– all examples of the marks being used in 
 
 85.  See Pamela Chestek, The First Amendment and Collective Marks, PROPERTY, INTANGIBLE 
(March 4, 2019) https://propertyintangible.com/2019/03/the-first-amendment-and-collective-
marks.html (listing jackets and T-shirts as the types of goods commonly used with collective 
membership marks); see also Reilly, supra note 20, at 15–16 (relating the expansion of Hells Angels 
merchandising to include clothing, housewares, jewelry, and other goods). 
 86.  See ABA Member Discounts & Offers, ABA (Nov. 27, 2019) 
https://www.americanbar.org/membership/aba_advantage_discounts/ (listing some of the 
member benefits such as discounts from clothing and electronics retailers, hotels and rental car 
agencies, and business services providers); Member Benefits, THE AMERICAN SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENGINEERS 
(Nov. 27, 2019) https://www.asce.org/member-benefits/ (listing the benefits to members, 
including access to networking and learning resources, free continuing credit courses, free 
technical resources, and discounts on publications, conferences, and insurance coverage); Louisa 
Steyl, 8 Best NRA Member Benefits, NEWSMAX (Dec. 5, 2017 11:40 AM) 
https://www.newsmax.com/FastFeatures/best-nra-member-benefits/2017/12/05/id/829980/ 
(providing an overview of some of the benefits NRA members enjoy such as discounts on insurance, 
identity theft protection, auto loans, vacation planning, a wine club membership, and subscriptions 
to NRA magazines, as well as access to firearms-related events and discounts from other partners).  
 87.  See Neal E. Boudette, G.M. Workers Approve Contract and End U.A.W. Strike, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
25, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/business/gm-contract.html (discussing the 
nation’s longest strike as having ended with multiple wins for the United Auto Workers’ 49,000 
members); see also Master Freight Agreement, TEAMSTERS (November 27, 2019) 
https://teamster.org/about/teamster-history/freight-agreement (highlighting the importance of 
the 1964 National Master Freight Agreement negotiated by the Teamsters, which would provide 
standardized protection and benefits to over 450,000 truck drivers). 
 88.  See Brian Martucci, 15 Best AAA Membership Discounts You Should Be Using, MONEY 
CRASHERS (June 12, 2019) https://www.moneycrashers.com/best-aaa-membership-discounts/ 
(providing a brief overview of the discounts and benefits AAA members enjoy); see also Benefits of 
Hiring a PGA Professional, THE PGA OF AMERICA (Nov. 27, 2019) https://www.pga.org/career-
services/hire-a-pga-professional/ (listing the advantages of being a PGA professional, including 
leveraging the reputation and brand strength of the PGA logo, accessing discount pricing offered by 
PGA partners, and enjoying free liability insurance coverage). 
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commerce, albeit in an indirect manner.89  Moreover, the benefits and 
discounts are often underwritten with membership dues, which pay for 
promotional materials, events sponsorship, and partnerships with other 
organizations.90  Thus, all trademarks, including marks used to express 
membership or affinity, have a distinct commercial nature that must be 
properly weighed in a forfeiture proceeding.91 
B. Collective marks and free speech 
Despite the inherent commercial nature of trademarks, the Lanham 
Act’s “use in commerce” requirement is not construed to strictly mean 
“for profit.”92  Advocacy groups, professional networking societies, 
charitable organizations, and collegiate fraternities are just a few 
examples of nonprofit organizations that hold collective membership 
marks used by the members to indicate their association with the 
groups.93  The marks thus implicate freedom of expression, leading 
many to agree with the current Supreme Court First Amendment 
jurisprudence of applying strict scrutiny to trademark laws regulating 
these protected freedoms.94  In the case of the Mongol Nation, their 
collective membership marks are used solely for the purpose of 
 
 89.  See Reilly, supra note 20, at 15–16 (describing how outlaw motorcycle gangs like the Hells 
Angels have learned to use their marks to sell branded merchandise); see also UPCOUNSEL, supra 
note 30 (explaining that collective marks like MacDonald’s help promote and market the goods and 
services). 
 90.  See Martucci, supra note 88 (listing several types of businesses AAA has partnered with 
to offer members discounts on their products); see also Anne Paddock, How NRA Membership Dues 
Are Spent, PADDOCK POST (Sept. 16, 2019) (detailing that thirty-two percent of membership and 
program revenue goes to “contributions, grants, and related organizations,” nine percent to 
advertising, and six percent to subscriptions and royalty payments, among other expenses). 
 91.  See INTA, supra note 77, at 5–6 (explaining that trademark law does not protect an 
expressive message separate from its commercial purpose); see also Martinez, supra note 68, at 21 
(arguing that even marks that do not represent goods or services for sale are still considered “use 
in commerce”). 
 92.  See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 
1997) (explaining that the Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” requirement does not limit protected 
activity to profit-seeking uses); see also Martinez, supra note 68, at 21 (stating that things that don’t 
propose a commercial transaction can still be considered “use in commerce”). 
 93.  See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1773 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing how 
a wide range of nonprofit organizations have trademarks that they use in furtherance of their 
cause); see also United, 128 F.3d at 90 (listing cases involving trademarks used by groups providing 
non-profit-seeking services). 
 94.  See Ramsey, supra note 7, at 410 (contending that strict scrutiny analysis applies in the 
evaluation of the constitutionality of a trademark law regulating expression protected by the First 
Amendment); see also Fewkes & Balle, supra note 65 (explaining how the Supreme Court found the 
Lanham Act provision challenged in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) to be unconstitutional 
restriction on speech, and how Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) was likely going to receive 
the same level of scrutiny).  
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identifying members; they are unity symbols that represent a 
brotherhood founded on a love for motorcycle riding.95  And while the 
government could establish that the Mongols’ marks eventually came to 
represent a renegade lifestyle of illegal activity, “tak[ing] the jacket right 
off” every Mongol’s back would have an impermissible chilling effect on 
the members’ future expression.96  But what about collective marks that 
exist for both commercial and noncommercial purposes?97  In a 
forfeiture proceeding, how should courts proceed when the line 
between expression and commerce has been blurred?98 
IV.     PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A. Strict or intermediate? 
In legal proceedings, every collective mark should be analyzed to 
determine which level of scrutiny is warranted in order to decide 
whether forfeiture is appropriate.99  Since marks which are used to 
identify a good or service exist solely for commercial purposes, they are 
subject to the intermediate scrutiny standard requiring a regulation to 
directly and materially further a substantial government interest and 
not harm speech more than necessary.100  All other collective marks, 
however, encompass both commercial and expressive speech, and thus 
 
 95.  See United States v. Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (relating that the 
Mongol Nation marks symbolize unity and brotherhood among the members and demonstrate an 
affinity for riding motorcycles); see also Chestek, supra note 85 (defining collective membership 
marks as marks whose sole purpose is to identify members). 
 96.  See Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1113-14 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (holding that a forced transfer of 
the Mongol Nation marks would lead to a chilling effect on the members’ free speech and 
association rights); see also Mantle, supra note 15 at 9:58 (explaining that the government may not 
restrain Mongols from expressing their membership and solidarity). 
 97.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (providing that collective trademarks and service marks indicate both 
membership in an association and a use of the mark in commerce); See also Kulik, supra note 18 
(describing the tension between free speech rights and the commercial rights of trademarks). 
 98.  See INTA, supra note 77, at 17 (arguing that an expressive component in a trademark 
should not change the traditional level of scrutiny used for commercial speech); see also Fewkes & 
Balle, supra note 65 (noting that with regard to the tension between First Amendment rights and 
trademarks, the Mongol Nation ruling protected the right of association). 
 99.  See Ramsey, supra note 7, at 435 (contending that the lack of a clear line between 
commercial and non-commercial speech is a problem courts must address in free speech challenges 
to trademark law); see also Frye, supra note 67 at 18:26 (stating that when trademarks constitute 
commercial speech they draw intermediate scrutiny, and when they constitute non-commercial 
speech they draw strict scrutiny). 
 100.  See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1355 (noting that the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) provided the intermediate scrutiny 
framework for determining whether restrictions on commercial speech are constitutional); see also 
Martinez, supra note 68, at 16 (explaining that regulations on commercial speech must survive the 
Central Hudson test). 
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require an analysis that properly weighs the expressive versus 
commercial character of the mark in order to determine the degree of 
First Amendment protection it should receive.101  Although the Court 
developed a commerciality test in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 
463 U.S. 60 (1983), it is difficult to apply in some collective mark cases 
and would likely be inapplicable in the case of collective membership 
marks.102  A more trademark-specific doctrine is needed in order to help 
courts draw a constitutional line between free speech and commercial 
speech.103 
Courts should conduct this analysis on a case-by-case basis, 
considering Bolger-like factors such as whether the owner-
organization’s goals are commerce-driven, whether the mark is used to 
raise money for the organization, whether those fund-raising efforts 
involve selling goods or services that display the mark, and whether the 
funds raised are used strictly for operational expenses.104  Under this 
analysis, a forfeiture proceeding on a collective membership mark like 
freecycle.org, which belongs to The Freecycle Network, would need to 
survive strict scrutiny analysis because although the organization’s 
purpose is to facilitate the exchange of used goods between users, the 
goods are always free, the mark is only displayed on member websites 
that host the local chapters, and while the mark is used to raise money 
 
 101.  See supra note 94; see also Frye, supra note 67 at 18:26 (stating that when trademarks 
constitute commercial speech they draw intermediate scrutiny, and when they constitute non-
commercial speech they draw strict scrutiny). 
 102.  See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983) (holding that 
expression comprised of commercial and non-commercial components is considered commercial 
speech when it is an advertisement for a specific product, and there is an economic motivation for 
the speech); see also Michael Mazur, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment in the 21st 
Century: Does the Nike Test Help Keep Corporations Honest?, 5 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 999, (2005) 
available at https://blj.ucdavis.edu/archives/vol-5-no-2/commercial-speech-and-the-first-
amendment.html (explaining that the Bolger test is designed to evaluate specific types of 
commercial speech, such as advertisements referencing specific products, and does not address 
commercial speech on a broader scale).  
 103.  See Martinez, supra note 68, at 2 (noting that the Supreme Court has not weighed in on 
the commerciality or non-commerciality of trademarks and the First Amendment protections they 
should be afforded); see also Lisa P. Ramsey, A Free Speech Right to Trademark Protection?, 106 
TMR 797, 882 (2016) (“[I]t is critical that we avoid applying free expression doctrines such as the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine . . . or laws regulating content-neutral regulations of 
expression to trademark registration law when those doctrines do not fit.”). 
 104.  See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67 (1983) (holding that expression comprised of commercial 
and non-commercial components is considered commercial speech when it is an advertisement for 
a specific product, and there is an economic motivation for the speech); see also Ramsey, supra note 
7, at 434 (explaining that because trademark laws regulate both commercial and non-commercial 
speech, each case should be evaluated individually). 
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via donations, grants, and the like, all the funds are used solely for 
operating expenses.105 
Another factor that should be considered is whether the mark 
owner has availed itself of trademark laws to enforce its rights against 
unauthorized commercial use.106  Seeking to enjoin commercial use by 
others is indicative of the commercial value an owner has placed on its 
mark, possibly even an intent to use the mark commercially, which tips 
the scale towards commercial speech.107  The Hells Angels Motorcycle 
Corporation (HAMC), for example, holds collective membership marks, 
service marks, and trademarks, and has successfully sued powerful 
corporations as well as lesser-known parties for infringement, often 
settling out of court for undisclosed sums of money.108  Because the 
marks are virtually identical, it is unnecessary to distinguish which one 
in particular is being enforced.109 
Further applying the factors discussed above, the HAMC marks 
paint a different picture than the freecycle.org mark.110  Although 
HAMC’s original purpose was never about commercial success, branded 
merchandising has gained importance in their business model.  In fact, 
HAMC has been using their marks to raise money by directly selling 
goods bearing the marks as well as licensing the rights to use the marks 
 
 105.  See Stephen Fishman, Reporting Nonprofit Operating Expenses, NOLO (Nov. 27, 2019) 
(describing program expenses as operational expenses directly related to carrying out a nonprofit’s 
mission); see also FREECYCLE.ORG, https://www.freecycle.org/about/funds (last visited Nov. 27, 
2019) (stating that approximately 90% of funds raised are used for program expenses and 10% is 
spent on membership and other administrative expenses).  
 106.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 20 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (stating 
that a collective mark can be infringed by use that is likely to cause confusion regarding the mark 
owner’s sponsorship or approval of goods or services); see also Jurgensen, supra note 12, at 524–
525 (observing that mark owners seek protection for their marks because the marks are valuable).  
 107.  Id.  
 108.  See Khurram Aziz, No Ordinary Suit, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MAGAZINE (March 2011), 
http://fritzclapp.com/IPM_Mar_2011_Interview.pdf (detailing the Hells Angels’ history of 
enforcing their trademark rights against unauthorized commercial use); see also Novagraaf, Law-
Abiding Outlaws: Trademark Protection the Hells Angels Way, LEXOLOGY (May 24, 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d2f2cc51-58b3-4bef-8b82-95c97818d647 
(citing notable trademark infringement lawsuits filed by HAMC against Amazon, Marvel Publishing, 
Walt Disney Motion Pictures, and Sak’s Fifth Avenue, among others). 
 109.  See Chestek, supra note 85 (agreeing with the court’s decision in Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 
to lump the goods and service marks with the collective membership marks). But see Aziz, supra 
note 108 (noting that the Hells Angels want exclusive control over their membership marks). 
 110.  See Christopher P. Bussert, The Perils of Naked Licensing, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
STRATEGIST (March 2011), https://www.kilpatricktownsend.com (detailing freecycle.org’s sole 
trademark infringement suit in which the court found freecycle.org had engaged in “naked 
licensing,” making its mark unprotectable). But see Serge F. Kovaleski, Despite Outlaw Image, Hells 
Angels Sue Often, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/us/despite-
outlaw-image-hells-angels-sue-often.html (reporting that the Hells Angels use their marks to sell 
merchandise and frequently enforce them against unauthorized merchandising by third parties). 
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to the independently-operated chapters across the globe.111  HAMC’s 
official website even contains links to worldwide merchandise sites that 
sell a wide variety of Hells Angels-branded goods.112  Additionally, Hells 
Angels-branded clothing, accessories, and housewares have been sold 
at club events and in retail stores, which weighs in favor of commercial 
speech.113  Finally, it is likely that HAMC, like other outlaw motorcycle 
gangs, use the money raised for expenditures that are not considered 
standard operational expenses for a nonprofit organization, such as the 
defense funds of members being criminally prosecuted.114  Thus, under 
this analysis, the commercial nature of the Hells Angels marks would 
substantially outweigh their expressive nature, and a forfeiture 
proceeding would receive intermediate scrutiny.115 
B. A change in the Lanham Act 
While the Lanham Act addresses fundamentals such as the 
definition, creation, extinction, and infringement of federally registered 
trademarks, the Act is silent on the treatment of marks in forcible 
 
 111.  See Kevin B. Sullivan, Hells Angels At 70: The Infamous Motorcycle Club Now Does Brisk 
Business Selling Branded Merchandise And Politicking, INSANE THROTTLE BIKER NEWS (July 16, 2018), 
https://harleyliberty.com/2018/07/16/hells-angels-at-70the-infamous-motorcycle-club-now-
does-brisk-business-selling-branded-merchandise-and-politicking/ (discussing how HAMC’s 
traditionally violent enforcement of its brand has developed into litigation to enforce its marks 
against unauthorized use); see also When Their Trademarks Are Used, the Hells Angels Resort Not to 
Violence but to High-Profile Lawsuits, THE FASHION LAW (Apr. 3, 2019) 
http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/when-their-trademarks-are-used-the-hells-angels-resort-
not-to-violence-but-to-lawsuits (describing how HAMC sells branded goods and licenses rights to 
the same to its charters across the world). 
 112.  See Reilly, supra note 20, at 16 (describing the sale of an expansive array of “support gear” 
bearing the club’s mark on Hells Angels local chapter websites); see also Nicholas Köhler, Route 81 
Is Closed: Police in P.E.I. Shut Down a Store That Sold Hells Angels Kitsch, MACLEAN’S (June 12, 2006) 
http://archive.macleans.ca/article/2006/6/12/route-81-is-closed (discussing an online retailer 
having made over $100,000 on Hells Angels branded goods prior to being shut down). 
 113.  See Novagraaf, supra note 108 (detailing the club’s sale of “support merchandise” to the 
public on club websites, in stores, and at parties and charity events); see also Nick Eagland, Why Is 
Drake Wearing a Hells Angels Support Hoodie in This Photo?, VANCOUVER SUN (Aug. 31, 2018) 
https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/tentative-drake-photographed-in-a-hells-angels-
shirt (explaining that Route 81 Toronto is a retail store that sells Hells Angels branded 
merchandise). 
 114.  See Reilly, supra note 20, at 38 (stating that proceeds from Mongol Nation merchandise 
sales ultimately go to defend members engaged in illegal activities); see also Eagland, supra note 
113 (explaining that funds from sales support a Hells Angels defense fund to help members fight 
criminal charges). 
 115.  See United States v. Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (explaining that 
under RICO defendants convicted of racketeering face forfeiture of any assets connected to the 
activity); see also Frye, supra note 67 at 18:26 (stating that when trademarks constitute commercial 
speech they draw intermediate scrutiny, and when they constitute non-commercial speech they 
draw strict scrutiny). 
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transfers.116  Since a mark may not be transferred without its goodwill, 
and a new owner must continue the mark’s identity and meaning to 
avoid abandonment or an assignment in gross, government forfeiture of 
a collective mark is simply not possible under current trademark 
laws.117  Caselaw is sparse; a provision addressing transfers of 
trademarks to the government would need to be added to the Lanham 
Act in order to ensure the government accomplishes its goals without 
running afoul of the Act’s purpose.118  Such a provision would direct that 
the government may only serve as an interim owner to a seized mark 
for a maximum period of three years, upon the expiration of which, if 
there has been no transfer to a new owner who will continue to use the 
mark with its associated goodwill, the mark would be abandoned and 
would enter the public domain.119  This rule would respect the transfer 
of goodwill, avoiding a total loss of the mark’s significance by essentially 
requiring assignment from the government to a new owner.120  Since the 
government would not want the mark to enter the public domain and 
thus become registrable by anyone, it would be in their interest to sell 
or otherwise transfer the mark to a party with a similar purpose who 
could potentially rehabilitate any negative image the mark has 
acquired.121 
This new Lanham Act provision would also basically preclude the 
government from enforcing the mark against the organization’s 
members, potentially infringing on their expressive rights.122  
 
 116.  See Professors, supra note 47 at 6–10 (discussing provisions in the Lanham act that 
address transfers of a trademark to a new owner); see also Reilly, supra note 20, at 57 (noting that 
the treatment of trademarks post seizure is not discussed in the Lanham Act). 
 117.  See Cash Processing Servs. v. Ambient Entm’t, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1234 (D. Nev. 2006) 
(finding that the government proved its intent to use the Mustang Ranch trademark for a brothel 
and thus the mark was not abandoned); see also Cavendish, supra note 45 (explaining that a 
trademark assignment that negates the trademark’s associated product or service is an 
assignment-in-gross and thus invalid). 
 118.  See Cavendish, supra note 45 (explaining that a trademark assignment that is an 
assignment-in-gross is invalid); see also Reilly, supra note 20, at 57 (proposing changes to the 
Lanham Act to solve the issue of treatment of trademarks post-seizure). 
 119.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence 
of abandonment.”); see also Professors, supra note 47 at 6 (explaining that the government would 
need to use the Mongol marks for the registered purpose, otherwise the marks would be deemed 
abandoned upon forfeiture). 
 120.  See supra notes 61–62.  
 121.  See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 147 (2d Cir. 2007) (asserting that once a mark 
is abandoned, it returns to the public domain and may be used by other actors in the marketplace); 
see also United States v. Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citing the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters collective membership mark as an example of a mark that shed its 
negative image years after the Teamsters were prosecuted for multiple RICO acts).  
 122.  See United States v. Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (stating that a 
forced Government seizure of the Mongol Nation’s marks would chill members’ rights to use the 
RENEGADE RIDERS AND THE MARKS THEY LOVE 5/29/2020  6:59 PM 
332 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.  Vol 19:3 
Confiscating goods bearing the mark or preventing members from 
displaying the mark would devalue it, and since the government would 
seek transfer to avoid abandonment, it would not engage in 
enforcement that depreciates the mark’s value.123  Additionally, even if 
the mark is abandoned due to non-use or misuse, members may still use 
the mark to express affinity or affiliation, or choose not to if the mark no 
longer has the same significance, since there would not be any mark 
owner to enforce “unauthorized” use.124  Thus, a change to the Lanham 
Act could facilitate a forcible transfer of a collective mark without 
unduly infringing on free speech.125 
V.     PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES: WHY DOES THIS MATTER ANYWAY? 
Organizations are becoming more trademark savvy, increasing 
their use of branding to promote their identity, which in turn increases 
the likelihood of misuse, both civil and criminal.126  Clear guidelines for 
forcible transfers of marks like collective marks will be necessary in 
order to balance law enforcement objectives and the goals of trademark 
laws.127 
A. Law enforcement goals 
The government’s principal reason for seizing the rights to a 
collective mark is deterrence.128  The government is acknowledging the 
increased use of branding by organizations like the Mongol Nation to 
promote and fund their illicit activities as well as recruit new members 
to further those activities, and acquiring the organization’s marks would 
send a powerful message of deterrence to motorcycle gangs and the 
 
marks without fear of legal retaliation, constituting a violation of the First Amendment); see also 
Rubin, supra note 8 (explaining that barring Mongols members from displaying the logo would 
potentially cross their constitutional rights to associate freely and express themselves). 
 123.  See infra note 137. 
 124.  See Chestek, supra note 85 (stating that consumers understand when marks reflect 
different goodwill); see also Mantle, supra note 15 at 9:58 (discussing how the government cannot 
prohibit persons from expressing membership and solidarity with a group). 
 125.  See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 126.  See Mantle, supra note 15 at 12:05 (explaining that criminal gangs seek trademark law 
protections for their logos, which are used to promote membership, in order to exercise exclusive 
control over them); see also Reilly, supra note 20, at 15–16 (noting that outlaw motorcycle gangs 
like the Mongol Nation have learned to register and protect their logos as well as use them for 
collateral merchandising programs). 
 127.  See infra Part V.A.–B. 
 128.  See Kovaleski, supra note 10 (noting the government’s purpose in seeking the Mongol 
Nation marks was to find a way to have “a real impact . . . “); see also Mantle, supra note 15 at 4:55 
(explaining that motorcycle gang insignia carry an important social value that recruits seek). 
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public at large.129  Organizations like the Hells Angels, whose highly-
treasured collective membership marks can no longer be seen as purely 
associative in nature due to their use in commerce, would be on notice 
that engaging in illegal activity could in fact imperil their rights over the 
marks.130  The ability of the government to seize these highly-valued 
marks would be a powerful weapon against criminal enterprises 
attempting to shield themselves in First Amendment protections, 
especially when traditional penalties such as prison sentences and fines 
have failed because the criminal enterprises had the resources to 
continue the activities with new recruits.131 
Given the ubiquity of logos and branding in today’s commerce, 
deterrence is especially important in light of new laws legalizing 
previously criminal activity, such as the production and sale of hemp 
products.132  Because these laws provide for an intersection of 
previously illicit activity with strict guidelines for legality, there is a 
likelihood that trademarks will still be used for criminal purposes, i.e. 
for products not meeting the definition of “legal.”133  In addition, there is 
growing momentum for the legalization of marijuana nationwide.134  As 
the hemp and marijuana markets develop, so too will organizations that 
 
 129.  See Nigel Duara, 7 Motorcycle Clubs the Feds Say Are Highly Structured Criminal 
Enterprises, L.A. TIMES (May 18, 2015 12:44 PM) (describing the seven principle outlaw motorcycle 
clubs comprised of several thousand members); see also Mantle, supra note 15 at 00:09 (noting that 
prosecutors believe controlling the Mongol Nation marks will curb recruitment and eliminate 
income made through merchandising). 
 130.  See supra Part I.C. 
 131.  See Alexander v. United States, 509 US 544 (1993) (stating that from a policy standpoint, 
enabling racketeers to evade forfeiture by hiding behind expressive activity would be disastrous); 
see also Application at 23 (explaining that traditional penalties often fail to deter criminals from 
engaging in illegal activity). 
 132.  See Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, 115 H.R. 2 (legalizing hemp and hemp 
products); see also Reilly, supra note 20, at 15–16 (noting that outlaw motorcycle gangs have 
increasingly learned to use branding and trademarks). 
 133.  See Harold B. Hilborn, 2018 Farm Bill Legalizes Hemp, but Obstacles to Sale of CBD Products 
Remain, THE NATIONAL REVIEW (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/2018-farm-
bill-legalizes-hemp-obstacles-to-sale-cbd-products-remain (discussing the legal limits of hemp 
under the 2018 Farm Bill); see also  Alex Vuocolo, Backpage.com to lose Delaware LLC formations, 
DELAWARE BUSINESS TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.delawarebusinesstimes.com/backpage-
losing-llc-formations/ (discussing the dissolution of Backpage.com and affiliate companies due to 
criminal convictions and abuse of company powers). 
 134.  See Claire Hansen, Comprehensive Marijuana Legalization Bill Passes House Committee in 
Historic Vote, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 20, 2019 4:00 PM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2019-11-20/comprehensive-
marijuana-legalization-bill-passes-house-committee-in-historic-vote (discussing House of 
Representatives approval of a bill to legalize marijuana); see also State Marijuana Laws in 2019 Map, 
GOVERNING (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.governing.com/gov-data/safety-justice/state-
marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html (noting the legality of medical marijuana use in 
thirty-three states and recreational marijuana in eleven states). 
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will use collective marks for non-commercial purposes, and the threat 
of forfeiture will no doubt help guide their use of their marks.135 
B. Lanham Act goals 
A forcible transfer of a collective mark being used to further illegal 
activities helps fulfill a key purpose of trademark laws: preventing 
consumer confusion in the marketplace.136  When an organization uses 
a mark in ways contrary to its stated purpose and acquired goodwill, it 
devalues the mark by undermining the group’s standards or purpose, 
causing unaware mark users and consumers alike to be misled.137  
Rather than letting a misused mark enter the public domain, 
transferring the mark to a new owner who will continue its intended use 
will further Lanham Act goals of protecting consumers and the free flow 
of commerce.138  Moreover, a new owner can disassociate the mark from 
illicit activities, providing the redemption needed to ensure the mark’s 
survival.139  Thus, transferring a mark that has been compromised by its 
owner’s misuse is the mark’s best chance at longevity.140 
VI.     CONCLUSION 
Collective marks are inherently commercial in nature, an important 
factor when evaluating the commerciality of a mark created for purely 
expressive purposes.141  Because trademark use is growing across all 
industries, and in some the line between licit and illicit is likely to be 
blurred, it is imperative there be clear guidelines addressing the seizure 
of marks when that line is crossed.142  A Lanham Act amendment 
limiting the scope of mark forfeiture, along with a new test for the 
degree of commerciality of a trademark, is the ideal solution to help 
 
 135.  See Dubinsky, supra note 14, at 381 (explaining that criminals conduct action only when 
the benefits outweigh the costs); see also Reilly, supra note 20, at 15–16 (noting that outlaw 
motorcycle gangs have increasingly learned to use branding and trademarks). 
 136.  See supra p. 9 and note 45. 
 137.  See Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 930 (2d Cir. 1984) (invalidating the sale of a singing 
group’s trademark due to a lack of continuity in management, quality, and style of music); see also 
Professors, supra note 47 at 15 (explaining that competing uses for a mark can lead to confusion 
for the user as well as the non-user). 
 138.  See supra notes 121–22, and accompanying text. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See supra Part V.B.  
 141.  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 142.  See supra note 20, and accompanying text. 
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advance important government objectives while respecting established 
trademark principles and fundamental rights. 
 
